

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0682

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0455

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FURTHER TREATMENT OF EASTERN MANPOWER FREEZE
PROPOSAL

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE DELEGATION CONSIDERS THAT THE
NOVEMBER 26 WARSAW PACT FREEZE PROPOSAL IS CONTRARY TO ALLIED
INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE REJECTED DEFINITELY AND SOON. THIS
MESSAGE CONTAINS REASONING SUPPORTING THIS CONCLUSION.
IT ALSO DESCRIBES AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL FOR POSSIBLE
USE IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES DECIDE THAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS,
SUCH AS ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, MAKE IT ADVISABLE
TO MAKE A MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN
PROPOSAL. WE REQUEST THAT FINAL WASHINGTON VIEWS BE
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PROVIDED THE DELEGATION AND USNATO NO LATER THAN

DECEMBER 3 TO PERMIT DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALLIED CONSENSUS ON HOW THE EAST PROPOSAL SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION OF THIS ROUND ON DECEMBER 10. END SUMMARY.

2. OUR OWN ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL LEADS US TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

A. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE WESTERN POSITION IS THAT THE WEST IS UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH THE EAST TO LIMIT NATO FORCES UNLESS THERE ARE COMPENSATING MILITARY ADVANTAGES. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS MEANS THAT ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT SHOULD REDUCE THE PRESENT DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

B. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE EASTERN POSITION IS THE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED EFFORT TO GET THE WEST TO ACCEPT CONTRACTUAL LIMITS ON NATO FORCES AT MINIMAL MILITARY COST TO THE SOVIETS.

C. THE EAST PROBABLY CALCULATES THAT IT WOULD GAIN ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE FROM WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF SOME LIMITED MEASURE THROUGH ITS VALUE FOR PROMOTING AN ATTITUDE OF EUPHORIA ON DEFENSE ISSUES IN WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION.

D. THE PRESENT EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL CONFORMS TO THESE PROBABLY EASTERN OBJECTIVES.

E. ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN THAT THE WEST WAS ACCEPTING THE PRESENT EAST-WEST FORCE RELATIONSHIP AS THE BASIS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT COVERING FORCES IN THE AREA, EVEN THOUGH NOT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. BUT WHAT CAN BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT IN ONE FIELD CAN BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT IN ANOTHER FIELD, ESPECIALLY IF IT IS A RELATED ONE.

F. IN THE FUTURE, THE WEST COULD NOT CONVINCINGLY ARGUE THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY AS THE RATIONALE FOR ITS REDUCTION

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PROPOSALS BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THAT DISPARITY FOR INCORPORATION IN AN AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS.

G. THEREFORE, ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL COULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR THE WEST TO ACHIEVE ITS NEGOTIATING GOAL OF BRINGING THE EAST TO ADDRESS THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY IN A SERIOUS WAY OR TO ACCEPT ANYTHING OTHER

THAN SYMETRICAL REDUCTIONS.

H. BY ACCEPTING THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, THE ALLIES WOULD ALSO BE VIOLATING THEIR OWN MAIN PRECEPT OF NOT ACCEPTING LIMITATIONS ON NATO FORCES UNLESS THERE WERE COMPENSATING MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

I. ACCEPTANCE WOULD TEND TO ESTABLISH MANPOWER ALONE AS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ALLIES WOULD BE PREJUDICING THEIR CASE THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SOVIET TANKS.

J. ACCEPTANCE WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR THE ALLIES TO INTRODUCE ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS OF THEIR OWN TO COMPENSATE FOR HEAVILY ASYMETRICAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS.

K. THE WEST WOULD IN PRACTICE BE UNDER A SPECIFIC CEILING; THE EAST WOULD NOT BE. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DELIBERATELY AVOIDS SPECIFYING THE FORCE TOTALS WHICH PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE TO MAINTAIN. BUT THE TOTAL OF WESTERN GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS ACCESSIBLE TO BOTH WESTERN PUBLIC MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPININ AND TO THE EAST. A FREEZE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSCIENTIOUSLY ENFORCED IN THE WEST AND ITS ENFORCEMENT WOULD BE SUPERVISED BY PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION. BUT ALTHOUGH ABLE TO VERIFY MAJOR INFRINGEMENTS, THE WEST WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENFORCE SIMILAR RIGOR IN THE EAST BECAUSE THE RECORD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SHOW THAT NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED AS TO THE TOTAL OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA.

L. SIMILARLY THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD FREEZE EACHINDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THE AREA, THUS
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EFFECTIVELY CREATING NATIONAL CEILINGS. INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS LOCATED IN THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD BE HELD BY THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION AND PARLIAMENTS TO THEIR PRESENT FORCE TOTALS.

M. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAS THE ADDITIONAL SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE THAT IT WOULD FREEZE OVERALL ALLIED MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE AREA AT THE ACTUAL PRESENT-FOR-DUTY LEVEL ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE. US GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER STRENGTH ALONE MAY BE AS MUCH AS 10,000 BELOW THE AUTHORIZED LEVEL. UK FORCES AND PROBABLY FORCES OF OTHER ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE SIMILARLY BELOW STRENGTH. A COMMITMENT FREEZING STRENGTHS AT UNDER-STRENGTH LEVELS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ADDING TO AN AGREED ALLIED REDUCTION BY THE AMOUNT OF THE EXISTING UNDER

STRENGTHS. THIS IS BECAUSE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT BRING THEIR FORCES UP TO STRENGTH BEFORE AN EFFECTIVE DATE WITHOUT EXACTING SIMILAR OFFSETTING PRIVILEGES.

N. REACTIONS IN CONGRESS MIGHT WELL BE NEGATIVE IF, AFTER A YEAR AND A HALF OF NEGOTIATION, THE FIRST CONCRETE RESULT WERE A FREEZE AGREEMENT. SOME ELEMENTS IN CONGRESS MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT AN

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0455

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

AN UNDERLYING US OBJECTIVE IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO CREATE A NEGOTIATED FLOOR UNDER US TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE.

O. DISCUSSION OF A FREEZE WOULD SHIFT THE

NEGOTIATING GROUND FROM THE ALLIES PHASE I REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL TO SOVIET GROUND. IN ESSENCE, THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN TRYING TO BRING BACK THE FOCUS OF EAST-WEST DISCUSSION TO THE WESTERN PHASE I THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA AND AIR MANPOWER. THIS EFFORT WOULD FAIL.

P. DISCUSSION OF A FREEZE COULD BE TIME CONSUMING, EATING UP THE LIMITED TIME AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ALLIES AND ABSORBING THE LIMITED CAPACITY OF ALLIED LEADERS
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TO CONCENTRATE ON THE MBFR PROJECT.

Q. THE PRECEDING SHORTCOMINGS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE MITIGATED BY LIMITING THE DURATION OF A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT. IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT POLITICAL PRESSURES IN THE WEST WOULD PREVENT THE ALLIES FROM DROPPING THE FREEZE COMMITMENT WHEN IT EXPIRED, NO MATTER HOW MUCH THE ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO DO SO FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

3. HENCE, ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD BE AGAINST WESTERN INTERESTS.

4. ON NOVEMBER 28, THE AD HOC GROUP UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL ON SIMILAR LINES FOR INCLUSION IN ITS YEAR END REPORT TO THE NAC OF THE SAME DATE (PARAS 4, 17 & 35 OF MBFR VIENNA 0454).

5. THE UK REP MADE CLEAR DURING AHG DISCUSSION AND IN SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH US THAT HE BELIEVED THAT, IF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WERE CONSIDERED SOLELY ON ITS INTRINSIC MERITS, THE BEST COURSE FOR THE ALLIES WOULD BE TO REJECT IT AS RAPIDLY AND DEFINITELY AS POSSIBLE. NONETHELESS, UK AND FRG REPS ARGUED IN THE AD HOC GROUP THAT IT MIGHT BE INADVISABLE FOR REASONS CONNECTED WITH IMPACT ON WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE ALLIES TO APPEAR CATEGORICALLY TO REJECT THE SUPERFICIALLY PLAUSIBLE EASTERN PROPOSAL AND THAT FOR THAT REASON ALLIES MIGHT CONSIDER MAKING A COUNTER-PROPOSAL INSTEAD.

6 WE UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH UK AND FRG REPS HAVE INFORMED THEIR CAPITALS THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS INTRINSICALLY UNDESIRABLE, BUT THAT BOTH HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED FOR POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION THE ALTERNATIVE OF AN ALLIED COUNTER-PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD COUPLE AGREEMENT TO A FREEZE WITH (A) THE REQUIREMENT OF EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT; AND (B) DROPPING NATIONAL

CEILINGS IN FAVOR OF (C) AGREEING ON SPECIFIC OVERALL
LEVELS FOR THE TOTAL AIR AND GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES,
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WHICH WOULD (D) HAVE TO BE EXPRESSED IN SPECIFIC NUMBERS.

7. WE DOUBT THAT, AT THIS STAGE OF THE WESTERN PUBLIC'S
PERCEPTION OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, UK AND FRG REPS
SENSITIVITIES ABOUT THE PUBLIC REACTION ARE JUSTIFIED. THOSE FEW
WESTERN JOURNALISTS WHO COVER THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
HAVE GRASPED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY
POINT AND WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE INCLINED TO ACCEPT
THE WESTERN POINT THAT A FORCE FREEZE WHERE THERE IS NO
AGREEMENT ON TOTALS WOULD NOT BE WORKABLE. HENCE,
IT PROBABLY WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE BY
WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION OF WESTERN REJECTION OF THE EASTERN
FREEZE PROPOSAL.

8. NONETHELESS, THERE MAY BE A RESIDUAL FEELING AMONG
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT ADOPT A
WHOLLY NEGATIVE POSTURE. IF SO, THERE IS A POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVE TO OUTRIGHT ALLIED REJECTION OF THE SOVIET
PROPOSAL. THIS MIGHT BE FOR THE WEST TO MAKE A COUNTER
PROPOSAL OF ITS OWN ON THE FOLLOWING LINES,
WHICH COMPREHEND MOST OF THE IDEAS THE UK AND FRG
REPS ARE NOW WORKING WITH:

BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT ALTERNATIVE JOINT DECLARATION

THE GOVERNMENTS OF (NAMES OF WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS) DECLARE THAT THEY HEREBY UNDERTAKE
NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL TOTAL OF THEIR GROUND
AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA COMPRISED BY
THE TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG AND THE NETHERLANDS ABOVE
THE PRESENT OVERALL LEVEL OF 987,000 MEN FOR A
PERIOD OF ONE YEAR.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF (NAMES OF EASTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS) DECLARE THAT THEY HEREBY UNDERTAKE
NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL TOTAL OF THEIR GROUND
AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA COMPRISED BY THE
TERRITORIES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC AND POLAND ABOVE THE PRESENT OVERALL LEVEL
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OF (BLANK) MEN FOR THE PERIOD OF ONE YEAR.
(THE ALLIES WOULD POSE THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT
THAT BOTH TOTALS WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED TOTALS.)

THE PARTICIPANTS WILL CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE
WITH THE AIM OF REACHING EARLY AGREEMENT.
IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITHIN ONE YEAR,
THE UNDERTAKING SET FORTH IN THIS DECLARATION
WILL BE SUPERSEDED BY THE TERMS OF THAT
AGREEMENT. THIS DECLARATION SHALL BE ENTIRELY
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE TERMS OF SUCH
AGREEMENT.
END TEXT.

9. AS ADDRESSEES WILL OBSERVE, THE MAIN WEIGHT OF
THIS PROPOSAL IS ON EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE
IDEA THAT A FREEZE SHOULD BE BASED ON AGREED OVERALL
MANPOWER TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD
OBLIGE THE EAST (A) TO FOREGO THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL
CEILINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A JOINT DECLARATION,
AND (B) TO COME TO AGREEMENT WITH THE ALLIES ON OVERALL
MANPOWER TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS.

10. WE HAVE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE DRAFT DECLARATION
A REQUIREMENT THAT THE EAST AGREE TO THE COMMON CEILING
PRINCIPLE AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON
A FORCE FREEZE. THE ALLIES PURPOSE IN MAKING A COUNTER-
PROPOSAL WOULD BE TO CONVINCE INTERESTED WESTERN PUBLIC
AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION THAT THE WEST IS ADOPTING A
REASONABLE POSITION. BUT WESTERN OPINION IS NOT LIKELY

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ACTION ACDA-10

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TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 (ISO) W

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0455

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

TO REGARD AN ALLIED DEMAND IN THE LIMITED CONTEXT
OF A FORCE FREEZE PROPOSAL THAT THE EAST AGREE TO
THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AS REALISTIC OR SERIOUS.

11. GIVEN THE EAST'S PRESENT RELUCTANCE TO EXCHANGE
DATA, WE DO NOT THINK IT IS LIKELY THAT THE EAST WOULD
AGREE TO THE PROPOSAL SET FORTH IN THE DRAFT DECLARATION
ABOVE. THERE IS NONETHELESS A LIMITED POSSIBILITY THAT
THE EAST MIGHT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL. IN THAT EVENT,
THE ALLIES WOULD BE THE GAINERS BECAUSE THEY WOULD
HAVE SECURED FROM THE EAST AN AGREED CONFIRMATION OF
THE EXISTENCE OF FORCE DISPARITIES IN THE
REDUCTION AREA.

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12. THE POINT IN THE DRAFT ABOVE THAT THE FREEZE WOULD NOT
PREJUDICE FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, WHICH THE EAST HAS ALREADY
INDICATED IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF ITS OWN
FREEZE PROPOSAL THAT IT COULD ACCEPT, WOULD DIMINISH
THE EAST'S CAPACITY TO CLAIM SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THE
WEST HAD ACCEPTED THE PRESENT OVERALL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE FORCES OF THE EAST AND WEST AND SHOULD THEREFORE ALSO
DO SO FOR THE PURPOSES OF NEGOTIATING REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.
IF THE APPROACH DISCUSSED HERE WAS ADOPTED, THE WEST WOULD
HAVE TO DROP ITS ARGUMENTATION ON THESE GROUNDS FOR
THE TIME BEING AND EMPHASIZE INSTEAD THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT
THAT THE FREEZE DID NOT FAVOR THE CASE OF EITHER SIDE AS TO
WHETHER REDUCTIONS SHOULD TAKE EXISTING DISPARITIES INTO ACCOUNT
OR BE BASED ON THE EXSITING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.

13. SHOULD THE EAST REFUSE A WESTERN COUNTER-PROPOSAL ON THE LINES DESCRIBED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE WEST COULD MAKE A GOOD CASE PUBLICLY FOR DECIDING TO REJECT THE FREEZE PROPOSAL DEFINITELY. ALLIES REPRESENTATIVES WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE EAST'S REPEATED REFUSAL TO AGREE ON FORCE TOTALS MADE THE IDEA OF A FORCE FREEZE UNWORKABLE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON EASTERN FORCE TOTALS IN THE AREA.

14. NEVERTHELESS, SUCH A SITUATION WOULD ENTAIL SOME RISK OF PRESSURE FROM GROUPS IN WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION DESIROUS TO SEE SPECIFIC PROGRESS ON DETENTE. SUCH GROUPS MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE ALLIES COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT THE EAST TO DIVULGE DATA AT THIS STAGE AND THAT US VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES WOULD ENSURE AT LEAST A ROUGH EASTERN COMPLIANCE.

15. IN THIS EVENT, THE ALLIES COULD PROBABLY STILL MAKE WESTERN REJECTION OF A FREEZE AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO WESTERN OPINION BY REVERTING TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ALLIES DID NOT WISH TO ACCEPT THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA AS A BASIS FOR AN EAST-WEST AGREEMENT.

16. AS A FURTHER ALTERNATIVE TO THE TWO COURSES DESCRIBED ABOVE, A THIRD COUSE WOULD BE FOR THE
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ALLIES TO OPPOSE THE FREEZE PROPOSAL IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST, BUT TO AVOID CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE IN SO DOING. PUBLICLY THE ALLIES WOULD STATE, IF THE EAST LEAKED THE PROPOSAL AS CONTINUES LIKELY, THAT THE EAST HAD MADE A FREEZE PROPOSAL, THAT THE ALLIES WERE STUDYING IT, BUT THAT THE PRELIMINARY ALLIED REACTION WAS SKEPTICAL AND WOULD PRESENT THEIR REASONS FOR THIS VIEW. IF THE UK OR FRG PROPOSED AN ALLIED COUNTER PROPOSAL OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE AND THE US PRESENTED TO THE ALLIES THE STRONG CASE WE BELIEVE CAN BE MADE FOR DEFINITELY REJECTING THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, THIS THIRD COURSE MIGHT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ALLIED CONSENSUS.

17. RECOMMENDATION: THE DELEGATION RECOMMENDS THAT THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL BE REJECTED CONCLUSIVELY AND SOON. THE DELEGATION AND USNATO WILL IN ANY EVENT NEED A DEFINITIVE WASHINGTON POSITION BY DECEMBER 3 IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARD ALLIED CONSENSUS IN TIME FOR AN AGREED WESTERN PRESENTATION IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF DECEMBER 10. ALLIED FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS BREAK WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE

UNWISE. IT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE EAST TO
BELIEVE THAT ITS PROPOSAL WAS RECEIVING FAVORABLE
ATTENTION OR AT LEAST WAS CAUSING DISSENT AMONG THE
ALLIES TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY COULD NOT MAKE A
UNIFIED REPLY. MOREOVER, IT WOULD LEAVE THE INITIATIVE
WITH THE EAST BOTH AS REGARDS IN THE NEGOTIATING FORUM
AND AS REGARDS PUBLIC MEDIA.RESOR

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